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ABSTRACT
Changes in dividend convey information about the earnings of the announcing fi rm 
which in turn aff ect the price. Security price depends on current earnings, past 
earnings, and future prospect of earnings. Dividend relevant theory postulates that 
dividend policy, dividend initiation and changes in dividend carry information about 
the market value of the announcing fi rms. Accordingly, an unexpected increase in 
dividends conveys positive information about the future profi tability of the fi rm 
and vice versa. Firm’s management is bett er informed than the market about the 
future prospects of their fi rm and therefore, their action relating to any fi nancing 
decision conveys information to the investors. The principal purpose of this study 
was to examine the intra-industry information eff ects of announcements of dividend 
initiations of the fi rms associated with Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). To test this 
hypothesis, we used Herfi ndahl Index and Tobin’s q ratio. The study found that the 
intra-industry eff ects of dividend revisions are apparent. 
Keywords: Industry rivals; announcing fi rms; dividend changes; rivals’ reactions; 
prediction error; cumulative average abnormal return; announcement date.
Introduction
The general beliefs of the security investors imply that the announcement 
of dividends by a fi rm could aff ect the stock prices of industry rivals. The 
general assumption of participants of security markets is that large revisions 
in dividends accompanied by stock price reactions for industry rivals of the 
announcing fi rms. Information transfers can provide contagion eff ects on 
rivals across the industry. Capital assets in the securities markets are priced 
on the basis of expected cash fl ows to be received in the form of cash receipts 
and capital appreciation in future time periods. All rational investors could w
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use all the available information about the securities being traded in the 
market. A market is called effi  cient if the prices of all the securities quickly 
and fully refl ect all the available and reasonably obtained information 
about the market and the subject securities as well. This concept of pricing 
of the capital assets postulates that investors will assimilate all information 
regardless of its categories into prices in making their buy and sell decisions. 
Foster (1981), in this connection, showed that earnings information of an 
individual fi rm in the industry conveys information about other fi rms in 
the same industry. This postulates that the earnings information disclosed 
by one fi rm in the same industry aff ect the price of another security. Intra-
industry information transfers, therefore, is also documented for a number of 
information releases including disclosures of corporate earnings, dividends, 
accounting, and other inside information. 
Bowen, Castanias, and Daley (1983) found that intra-industry formation 
transfer documents for a number of predisclosures like sales announcements, 
earnings release, and management forecasts about the future earnings. They 
found the impact of dividends on the stock prices of the rivals. The impacts 
of mergers and acquisitions of the fi rms on stock prices of other fi rms were 
documented by Eckbo (1983), Olsen, Dietrich, and Bernerd (1985), Joh and 
Lee (1992) postulated the eff ect of sales announcements on the rival fi rms 
within the same industry. Swary (1986) depicted the consequence eff ects of 
regulatory actions on other fi rms within the industry. Baginski (1987), Han, 
Wild, and Ramesh (1989) experienced the impacts of management forecasts 
on the stock prices of industry rivals. On going-private transactions as seen 
by Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1991) carry impacts on the prices of rivals 
within the industry. Consequently, the impact of dividend changes on the 
rival fi rms was examined by Firth (1996). In this connection, Howe and Shen 
(1998) examined the eff ects of dividend initiations on rivals. Subsequently, 
Paul, Starks, and Yoon (1998) tested the dividend announcement eff ects on 
the other fi rms within the same industry. They documented the stock price 
reactions to the intra-industry information transfers due to the contagion or 
competition between the fi rms. They also documented that the rival fi rms’ 
stock price reactions tend to be the same direction as the announcing fi rm’s 
price reaction. This may happen as the result of the release of information on 
the overall wealth of the industry. On the other hand, opposite circumstances 
may, therefore, be considered due to the result of shift s in the industry’s 
competitive balance. In this connection, fi rms within the industry show a 
negative stock price reaction to the bankruptcy announcement of a rival 
(Lang & Stulz, 1992). This indicated that factors leading to bankruptcy or 
any accident or event that carry bad news for the fi rm are industry-wide. 
They, however, show a positive reaction to the price of the rivals to the 
bankruptcy announcement where they indicate that competitive eff ects 
are more important. Szewczyck (1992) found that rivals have signifi cant 
contagion eff ects to the announcements of seasoned issues. Seasoned issues w
w
w
.ij
m
s.
uu
m
.e
du
.m
y
 Ĳ MS 17 (1), 55-67 (2010)    57 
refer to the additional fi nancing through initial public off erings (IPOs) by the 
existing companies. The patt ern of raising and disbursement of cash to the 
shareholders of the announcing fi rms react to security prices of the rivals. 
For example, share repurchases refer to the situation where the fi rms buy 
back the securities from the owners. In this situation, the rivals’ reactions 
are considered to be opposite following the announcements of repurchases. 
Hertzel (1991) found very litt le or no reaction at all to such announcements. 
A large number of studies by Pett it (1972), Eades, Hess, and Kim (1985), 
Kalay and Loewenstein (1985-1986), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith 
and Mullins (1983), Bajaj and Vĳ h (1990), Yoon and Starks (1995) showed 
that management forecasts as well as the announcement of dividend 
changes convey information about the value of the announcing fi rms and 
the rival fi rms within the industry as well. Bhatt acharya (1979) and Kalay 
(1980) showed that the value of the fi rm is related to the announcement of 
dividends, i.e. value of the subject fi rm depends on the amount of dividends 
declared. John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) argued that 
managers (also the directors, major shareholders, and accountants) have 
access to information about the fi rm’s inside that the outsiders do not have. 
The most important factor in the fi rm’s dividend policy is the anticipated 
level of the fi rm’s future earnings and the patt ern of past dividends. Dividend 
changes assumed to be such inside information result in the positive stock 
price changes for the fi rms announcing dividend increases. However, the 
announcements of dividends and the dividend changes disclose information 
relevant for the announcer’s rivals. The impact on the rival fi rm depends 
on whether the information has a net contagion or a competitive eff ect. A 
contagion eff ect is a result of fi rm’s returns, which is driven by common 
factors, i.e. the extent to which fi rms in that industry share inputs, outputs, 
production process, fi nancial market, and labour markets. Information 
disclosure of one fi rm, like dividend revisions, could provide information 
about these factors, eliciting similar stock price revisions for all fi rms in 
the industry. In this connection, Marsh and Merton (1987) suggested that 
contagion eff ects may result if the individual fi rm uses industry practices 
as targets for their own dividend policies with a view to maximising the 
wealth for the shareholders. As a result, the announcement of a dividend 
change conveys signal on the likelihood that a rival fi rm will change its 
dividend in the same direction. A dividend increase might disclose the 
strongliness of the announcing fi rm, more than previously anticipated. A 
dividend decrease, on the other hand, might disclose the weakness relative 
to certain rivals as well as negative industry information. Furthermore, 
either of the contagion eff ects (positive or negative) on industry rivals can 
be att enuated or reversed by the competitive eff ects. Jensen and Johnson 
(1995) argued that rivals having litt le dominance in the market and few 
resources experience large off sett ing negative competitive eff ects when 
a rival announces a dividend increase and weak fi rms experience a small w
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positive competitive eff ect that only partially off sets the negative industry 
information in a dividend-decrease announcement when a rival decreases 
its dividend. Activities of a fi rm around dividend decreases can negatively 
aff ect the fi rm’s future competitive position. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
applied the model of Miller and Modigliani (1966) to test the eff ects of 
dividend on the valuation of the announcing fi rms.
The purpose of the our study was to examine whether there are disparate 
reactions to the rivals of dividend announcing fi rms listed with the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange during the period under study. This study used the sample 
of dividend increases and decreases showing the same announcement, 
which may have diverse eff ects within the same industry of DSE. The 
contagion eff ects dominate for some rivals. The contagion eff ects are off set 
by competitive shift s for other rivals in the same industry. 
The key distinctions are the relative market power and the growth options of 
the rivals vis-à-vis the announcing fi rm. Using some relevant sample, rivals’ 
reactions may or may not be evident. The fi rm characteristics can infl uence 
whether rival fi rms have a contagion or competitive reaction. Regardless of 
how refi ned the industry defi nition is, the implication is that there may still 
be cross-sectional diff erences in the information transfers.
Data and Methodology
Model Specifi cation
Negative information about the industry specifi cation raises the question of 
which one of the announcer’s industry rivals is in the weakest position to 
respond to the announcing fi rm’s weakness and to withstand any industry-
wide bad news. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) argued that fi rms performing 
slightly bett er in the industry are less able to withstand the signaled industry-
wide troubles than the fi rms performing bett er. The fi rms without fl exibility 
in their future operations are not as well prepared to respond eff ectively to 
the new industry environment. Paul et al. (1998) found that fi rms lacking 
current market power relative to their industry rivals and also those lacking 
options in their future operations will be most severely aff ected by their bad 
news about their rivals. 
The performance of an industry might be estimated through a commonly 
used measure based on the extent of concentration in the market shares called 
the Herfi ndahl Index. The theoretical concept of Herfi ndahl Index derives 
from cournot competition under which the total profi ts of an industry from 
existing operations are measured in its Herfi ndahl Index. It is estimated as 
the sum of squared market shares for all fi rms in an industry. Then, the 
market power of a particular industry rival relative to an announcing fi rm 
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is measured by comparing their contribution to the industry’s Herfi ndahl 
Index. However, the contribution of an individual fi rm’s Herfi ndahl is 
an index in the market power of that fi rm relative to its industry rivals. 
However, Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), and Venkatesh (1989) found that 
earnings and dividend announcements have an interactive eff ect and 
thus the requirement of non-contaminating earnings announcements is 
particularly appropriate. The other important data observations needed for 
the analyses are the Tobin’s q market share of industry revenue data. The 
announcing fi rms and the industry rivals should be included in the general 
price index. To estimate the stock price reaction for the announcing fi rm, the 
study is devoted to use the market model, one of the derivatives of capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) in order to estimate the prediction error for the 
fi rm on a particular day. The specifi cation of the market model is:
            rit = αi + βi rmt + εit                                  (1)
where,
          rit = return of stock i at time t,
          rmt = return of the market at time t,
          εit = error term of stock i at time t, and
          αi , βi are market model parameters.
The residual or prediction error can easily be found by using the mechanism 
as defi ned and used by Bajaj and Vĳ h (1990):
           εit = rit – αi – βirmt                                                 (2)
With a view to estimating the intra-industry eff ect of dividend announcements, 
we can construct an equally weighted portfolio of the rival’s shares for each 
announcement. Therefore, such a portfolio of the rival fi rms provides a 
powerful test as it averages over the random noise in individual rivals’ stock 
returns. To test such portfolio eff ects, we divided the industry rival portfolios 
into subsamples according to the two defi ning fi rm competitive eff ects with, 
Tobin’s q ratio and the Herfi ndahl contribution explaining the rival fi rms’ 
reactions. We fi rst divided the rival fi rms into two subsamples according to 
whether their Tobin’s q is greater than or less than the announcing fi rm’s q 
ratio. Thereaft er, we subdivided each subsample into two more subsamples 
according to whether the rival’s Herfi ndahl contribution is greater or 
less than the announcing fi rm’s Herfi ndahl contribution to estimate the 
prediction errors for four subsample portfolios. Even clustering is inherent 
in an investigation of rivals’ stock price reactions. Then we obtained the 
cumulative average prediction error, which we calculated by averaging 
the prediction error across fi rms (or portfolio) and acumulating over the 
announcement day and the previous day. The standardised prediction error 
approach developed by Dodd and Warner (1983) was applied to test the 
statistical signifi cance.
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Data Specifi cation
In this section, we describe the samples of dividend initiating and rival fi rms 
by applying statistical tools. To assess the intra-industry eff ect of dividend 
announcements, we adopted an event study methodology. The fi rst step in 
the analysis was to use a sample of dividend increase and dividend decrease 
announcements of the fi rms listed with DSE obtained from the daily record 
book of DSE. Dividend changes for a variety of reasons depending on the 
management earnings forecasts and many anticipated events as well. With 
a view to testing the reaction of the stock prices to the dividend change 
announcement, it is essential to obtain the dividend announcement date, 
which is usually referred to as day 0. We obtained the daily return data for 
the trading days around the dividend announcement for the announcing 
fi rms and the industry rivals from the daily return record book kept by 
DSE. To make ensure that our sample is relatively free of contaminating 
announcements, the announcing fi rms must not have either any major 
fi nancing or investment announcements on the dividend announcement day, 
or an earnings announcement within a week of the dividend announcement, 
or a stock split or stock dividend within a month. 
The study covers the observations during the period from January 1991 to 
December 2005. During this period, 105 observations announced dividend 
increase and 77 observations announced dividend decrease. So, the study 
covers a total of 182 announcing observations. Also during this period 
135 observations were found suitable as industry rivals during the time 
dividend increase, while a total number of 95 observations of industry rivals 
were found at the time of dividend decrease.
Empirical Test and Results
Table 1 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns as percentages 
for 105 observations announcing dividend increase and 77 observations 
announcing dividend decrease during January 1991 to December 2005. 
The cumulative average returns for 135 observations of industry rival fi rms 
during the time dividend increase and a total number of 95 observations of 
industry rival fi rms at the time of dividend decrease were estimated. Table 
1 depicts the stock price reaction for the announcing fi rms as well as for the 
portfolio for the industry rival fi rms. In panel A of Table 1, we present the 
sequence of the dividend increase of the announcing fi rms and results of the 
dividend decrease of the same are shown in panel B. The table shows that 
the observations of the announcing fi rms experience substantial abnormal 
returns at the time of their dividend change announcement. About 65% of 
observations of the announcers and 50% of the observations of the rival 
portfolios have positive abnormal returns at the time of announcement. 
Before dividend announcements, 58% of observations among the announcers 
and 52% of the rival portfolios also have positive abnormal returns in case 
of dividend increases. However, all the observations from both announcers 
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and rival portfolios have overall positive abnormal returns around dividend 
announcements in case of dividend increase.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the observations of the industry rivals tend 
to react negatively to the observations of the announcing fi rm’s dividend 
decrease. Panel B of Table-1 shows that about 33% of observations of the 
rival portfolio have negative abnormal returns at the time of announcement, 
but 42% of observations of the same also have the negative abnormal 
returns before the announcements of dividends. In contrast, 11% and 29% 
of observations of the announcers have negative abnormal returns at the 
time of announcements and before announcements, respectively. However, 
all the observations from both announcers and rival portfolios have negative 
abnormal returns both at the time of and before the announcements of 
dividend decrease. 
Table 1
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Announcing Firms and Non-announcing 
Industry Rivals around the Dividend Announcement
Panel-A: Announcements of Dividend Increase
Announcer
Period 
Rival Portfolio
–15, –2 –2, 0 + 1, +15 – 15, – 2 – 2, 0 + 1, +15
2.48 1.84 2.12 CAARs   .52 1.21 .05
3.01 5.52 3.56 z-statistics 1.02   .95 .75
  58    65     55 %     52   50   49
Panel-B: Announcements of Dividend Decrease
Announcer
Period 
Rival Portfolio
–15, –2 –2, 0 + 1, +15 –15, –2 –2, 0 + 1, +15
– 3.20 –7.02 2.50 CAARs –1.45 –2.37 .95
– 6.23 –12.87 3.45 z-statistics –2.56 –2.97 .85
    29      11     55 %      42    33    45
Notes.  i) Period refers to the days relative to dividend announcement.
 ii) CAARs refer to the cumulative average abnormal returns. 
In addition to the results found for the rival portfolios, now we focus on 
whether a combination of contagion and competitive eff ects exists within 
an industry. Table 2 shows the results indicating the industry rival reactions. 
Panel A of Table 2 exhibits that for dividend increase, only rivals with a 
larger Tobin’s q than the announcing fi rms’ value have larger Herfi ndahl 
contribution. These rivals experience a signifi cant positive two-day 
cumulative average prediction error of 0.52%, while the reactions for others 
are closer to zero. In contrast, Panel B of Table 2 shows that in case of dividend 
decrease, only rivals whose Tobin’s qs and Herfi ndahl contributions are 
smaller than the announcing fi rms’ experience a signifi cant reaction. 
These rivals experience a signifi cant negative two-day cumulative average 
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predictive error of 1.5%; where as the reactions for others are insignifi cantly 
diff erent from zero. The results of Table 2 indicated that the stock market 
of Bangladesh, particularly Dhaka Stock Exchange, infers signifi cant 
information from dividend announcements for some industry rivals. The 
results indicated that signifi cant stock price reactions occur for those rivals 
having competitive eff ects off sett ing the contagion eff ects of the dividend 
announcements. We may further extend our study by saying that the 
stronger rivals seem to be less likely to place at a competitive disadvantage 
when an announcer reveals a positive signal. Similarly, weaker rivals are 
least likely to gain a competitive advantage when an announcer reveals a 
negative signal.   
Table 2
Abnormal Returns to Subsamples of Rival Portfolio to the Announcement of 
Dividend Changes
Panel-A: Announcements of Dividend Increase
Rivals’ Tobin’s q> 
Announcer’s Tobin’s q
Rivals’ Tobin’s q<
Announcer’s Tobin’s q
R i v a l s ’ _ H C > 
Announcer’s _HC
CAAR 0.52 0.10
z-statistics 2.35 1.05
%                  60                 52
N                  75                 90
R i v a l s ’ _ H C < 
Announcer’s _HC
CAAR 0.22                – 0.25
z-statistics 0.20                – 0.60
%                  50                 48
N                100               105
Panel-B: Announcements of Dividend Decrease
Rivals’ Tobin’s q>
Announcer’s Tobin’s q
Rivals’ Tobin’s q<
Announcer’s Tobin’s q
R i v a l s ’ _ H C > 
Announcer’s _HC
CAAR 0.52                – 0.08
z-statistics 1.20                – 0.50
%                  55                 45
N                  60                 40
R i v a l s ’ _ H C < 
Announcer’s _HC
CAAR                   0.12                – 1.50
z-statistics                – 0.32                – 3.20
%                  40                 32
N                100                 80
Notes.  i) HC stands for Herfi ndahl Contribution.
ii) CAAR stands for cumulative average abnormal returns.
 iii) Percentages (%) refer to positive abnormal returns. 
 iv) N stands for number of industry rival-fi rm portfolios.w
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Table 3 portrays two-day mean cumulative average abnormal returns as 
percentages for industry rival fi rms at the time of dividend declaration during 
the period under study. Abnormal returns are derived from the market 
model. We constitute subsamples according to whether the rivals’ responses 
are hypothesised to be in the same direction as the announcer’s reaction 
or in the opposite direction. We hypothesised that for the announcement 
of dividend increase, rivals with large Herfi ndahl contributions and large 
Tobin’s qs relative to the announcers have a reaction in the same direction, 
and those with small Herfi ndahl contributions and small Tobin’s qs have a 
reaction in the opposite direction. For dividend decrease announcements, we 
hypothesised that the rivals with small Herfi ndahl contributions and small 
Tobin’s qs relative to the announcers have reaction in the same direction, 
and those with large Herfi ndahl contributions and large Tobin’s qs have 
reactions in the opposite direction. Table 3 reveals that all observations of the 
announcements of dividend increase and decrease, the last column of Panel 
A evidences that the two-day cumulative abnormal prediction errors of rivals 
for which competitive eff ects would be least likely to off set contagion eff ects 
is 0.80%, indicating that reactions in the same direction, as hypothesised 
for the announcer, are positive. On the other, the rivals experiencing the 
largest off sett ing competitive eff ects have a negative –0.36% mean two-day 
reaction, which is not signifi cantly diff ering from zero. The last column of 
Panel B of Table 3 shows a t-test of the diff erence in the means between 
the market reactions for the two subsamples confi rming that they are 
signifi cantly diff erent at the 0.01 level of signifi cance. The evidence suggests 
that the eff ects of shift s in an industry’s competitive balance should be most 
evident in the industries where the rivalries of which are most important 
and such industries have large values of the Herfi ndahl Index. Columns 
3 and 4 of Table 3 reveal that the industries with above-median values of 
the Herfi ndahl Index experience a greater diff erence between the two types 
of rivals’ reactions, indicating that these industries are stronger in terms of 
competitive eff ects than those with below-median values of the Herfi ndahl 
Index. Table 3 also shows that the diff erence between the mean cumulative 
abnormal prediction errors for industry rivals showing contagion eff ects 
versus rivals having contagion eff ects off set by competitive eff ects is 1.80% 
subject to the industries having above-median Herfi ndahl Index values. 
In contrast, for industries with below-median Herfi ndahl Index, the 
corresponding value is 0.80%.   w
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Table 3
Hypothesis Tests for Abnormal Returns of Industry Rivals on Dividend 
Announcements
Panel-A: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Prediction Errors
Industries with 
Above Median HI
Industries with 
Below Median HI
All 
Observations
Hypothesis-I
CAPEs    1.50     .52      .80
z-statistics    3.60    2.00    4.00
%                65               60            62
N                60               80          140
Hypothesis-II
CAPEs – 0.50 – 0.26           – 0.36
z-statistics  –1.00 – 0.70  –1.15
%                45               50            48
N                70             100          170
Panel-B:  Diff erence of Means for Cumulative Abnormal Prediction Errors
Industries with 
Above Median HI
Industries with 
Below Median HI
All 
Observations
Hypothesis-III
CAPEs 1.80   .80 1.20
z-statistics 3.00 2.50 4.25
Notes. i)       HI stands for Herfi ndahl Index.
 ii)  CAPE stands for cumulative abnormal prediction errors.
 iii)  Percentages (%) refer to positive abnormal returns. 
 iv)  N stands for number of industry rival-fi rm portfolios.
 v)  Hypothesis: I—indicating that rivals’ reactions are assumed to be in the same direction as 
Announcer’s reactions. 
 vi)  Hypothesis: II— indicating that rivals’ reactions are assumed to be in the opposite direction as 
Announcer’s reactions. 
 vii)  Hypothesis: III— indicating that rivals have reactions in the same direction as Announcer Vs. 
rivals have reactions in the opposite direction from Announcer. 
Conclusion and Policy Implication
In an imperfectly competitive industry, contagion eff ects can be off set by 
information contained in the dividend announcement concerning shift s in 
the industry’s competitive balance. The extent of such off sett ing competitive 
eff ects depends on several factors, including the relative market power 
of the fi rms involved, the ability of the rival to respond eff ectively to the 
announcer’s revelation, and the extent of competition in the industry. 
The present paper had examined the stock price reactions on the part of 
industry fi rms to rivals’ announcements of dividend. This study found that 
the observations of the announcing fi rms experience substantial abnormal 
returns at the time of their dividend change announcement. Observations 
of the announcers and those of the rival portfolio have positive abnormal 
returns at the time of announcements. Before dividend announcements, the w
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observations among the announcers and those of the rival portfolios also 
have positive abnormal returns in case of dividend increase. However, all the 
observations from both announcers and rival portfolios have overall positive 
abnormal returns around dividend announcements in case of dividend 
increase. On the other hand, the observations from both announcers and 
rival portfolio have negative abnormal returns both at the time of and before 
the announcements of dividend decrease. The present study indicated that 
signifi cant stock price reactions occur for those rivals having competitive 
eff ects off sett ing the contagion eff ects of the announcements of dividend. 
We may further extend our study by saying that the stronger rivals seem to 
be less likely to be placed at a competitive disadvantage when an announcer 
reveals a positive signal. Similarly, weaker rivals are least likely to gain 
a competitive advantage when an announcer reveals a negative signal. 
Finally, the study revealed that the industries with above median values of 
the Herfi ndahl Index experience a greater diff erence between the two types 
of rivals’ reactions, indicating that these industries are stronger in terms of 
competitive eff ects than those with below median values of the Herfi ndahl 
Index.
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